Two Astronauts Came Dangerously Close to Disaster. Here's What NASA Found.
NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman has delivered a scathing assessment of Boeing's CST-100 Starliner program, retroactively classifying the June 2024 crewed flight as a Type A mishap—the agency's highest severity designation for incidents that posed grave risks to crew and mission objectives. The independent investigation reveals systemic failures in decision-making and leadership that went far beyond engineering mistakes, raising questions about whether Boeing and NASA prioritized program viability over human safety.
Astronauts Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams launched aboard Starliner on June 5, 2024, after years of delays and technical setbacks. During rendezvous and docking with the International Space Station, the spacecraft experienced multiple thruster failures and a temporary loss of six-degree-of-freedom control—the ability to maneuver in all three axes. Had different decisions been made at that critical moment, Isaacman stated bluntly, "the outcome of this mission could have been very different." The astronauts ultimately remained on the ISS and returned via SpaceX's Crew-9 in March 2025, a decision that now appears prescient.
A Program Plagued Since Inception
Starliner's troubles trace back to its 2010 inception under NASA's Commercial Crew Program, which aimed to establish "dissimilar redundancy"—two independent American crew vehicles—after Space Shuttle retirement. The program's first uncrewed test in December 2019 exposed a fundamental problem: a mission elapsed time error caused excessive thruster firings and incorrect orbital insertion. Rather than diagnosing root causes, NASA and Boeing treated the symptoms and moved on.
OFT-2 in May 2022 brought more red flags. During pre-flight testing, 13 of 24 oxidizer valves in the Service Module failed to open, stuck in the closed position. Again, investigations focused on proximate causes rather than systemic problems. "The OFT and OFT-2 investigations did not drive to, or take sufficient action on, the root causes of major anomalies," Isaacman wrote, adding that teams "often stopped at the proximate cause, treated it with a fix, or accepted the issue as an unexplained anomaly."
The Real Problem Wasn't the Hardware
Isaacman's most damning statement zeroed in on organizational failure: "The most troubling failure revealed by this investigation is not hardware. It is decision-making and leadership that, if left unchecked, could create a culture incompatible with human spaceflight."
The independent report identified pervasive mistakes spanning contract management, technical rigor, and oversight. NASA adopted what investigators called a "limited-touch acquisition and management posture," granting variances that left the agency without sufficient systems knowledge to properly certify a human-rated spacecraft. Boeing's propulsion system was permitted to operate outside qualification limits—fundamentally incompatible with crew safety margins. Meanwhile, the institutional desire to maintain two dissimilar crew systems sometimes subordinated safety discussions to program preservation.
Isaacman acknowledged NASA's share of responsibility: "We managed the contract. We accepted the vehicle. We launched the crew." He also noted that design compromises meant Starliner became "less reliable for crew survival than other crewed vehicles."
What Happens Now
Congress will receive briefings from NASA and the independent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), a powerful oversight body embedded in human spaceflight decisions since the Space Shuttle era. The full independent investigative report has been released publicly as part of Isaacman's transparency initiative. Technical investigations into root causes of thruster anomalies continue, but organizational accountability is the immediate focus. Boeing has stated the report will "reinforce ongoing efforts," though observers note the company faces potential contract modifications and heightened scrutiny. For the broader commercial space industry, this moment signals that NASA's oversight posture is tightening—and that programmatic convenience will no longer trump crew safety.






